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Data from the 1982 and 1989 Monitoring the Future Surveys are used to examine the
substitutability of alcoholic beverages and marijuana among youths. Beer prices and minimum
legal drinking ages are used as measures of the full price of alcohol, while an indicator of
marijuana decriminalization and its money price capture the full price of marijuana. Results
indicate that drinking frequency and heavy drinking episodes are negatively related to beer prices,
but positively related to the full price of marijuana. The implications of this substitution for one
of the consequences of youth substance abuse, driving while intoxicated, is examined using
information on youth non.fatal accidents taken from the surveys and on youth fatal motor vehicle
accidents constructed from the Fatal Accident Reporting System. These results indicate that the
net effect of an increase in the full price of alcoholic beverages on the probability of a youth
traffic crash is negative. However, the opposite is found for marijuana. That is, the results imply
that the reduction in accidents resulting from substitution away from alcoholic beverages and
other intoxicating substances to marijuana as its full price is lower more than offsets the increase
in accidents related to marijuana use.
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Youth drinking and alcohol abuse have been a focus of government policy since
the mid 1970's. When the 26th amendment to the Constitution lowered the voting age
to 1 8 years1 a number of states followed by also lowering their minimum legal drinking
ages. The consequent increase in youth alcohol abuse, particularly in drinking and
driving, led many states to rethink this policy. By 1984, the federal government became
involved in what had traditionally been left up to states to decide by enacting the Federal
Uniform Drinking Age Act. This act pressured states into raising all legal drinking ages
to 21 years or suffer the penalty of losing part of the highway funds they received from
the federal government. By 1988, all states had complied. The higher drinking ages
succeeded in reducing youth alcohol use and abuse (for example: Coate and Grossman,
1988; Saffer and Grossman, 1987). However, drinking, heavy drinking, drunken driving,
and other measures of youth alcohol abuse remain stubbornly high. For example, in
1991, approximately 30 percent of high school seniors report at least one heavy drinking
episode (five or more drinks on a single occasion) at least once in the previous two
weeks.
Three recent econometric studies suggest that part of the reason for the
persistently high level of youth drinking may be the success of the 'War on Drugs",
particularly with respect to marijuana. In the first of these, John DiNardo and Thomas
Lemieux (1992) use state level tabulations for 43 states of marijuana and alcohol use
taken from the annual Monitoring the Future (MTF) survey of high school seniors over the
years from 1980 through 1989 to look at the effects of increases in legal drinking ages.
1They find that the higher legal drinking ages did reduce youth alcohol consumption, as
expected. However, they find that the lower alcohol consumption was accompanied by
an almost one-for-one increase in marijuana consumption. They conclude that this
unintended consequence is attributable to standard substitution effects.
In two studies, Karyn Model looks at the effects of marijuana decriminalizationon
drug related hospital emergency room episodes, (1993) and violent crime (1991). Based
on the hospital emergency room data, she concludes that marijuana decriminalization
leads individuals to substitute away from alcohol and otherillegal drugs towards
marijuana. She finds that emergency episodes related to marijuana useare higher in
states which have decriminalized, while those related to alcohol and otherillegal drug use
are lower. Similarly she finds that lower violent crime rates,particularly homicide rates,
are associated with marijuana decriminalization. Since a highpercentage of violent
crimes are alcohol related, she attributes the lower crimerates in states which have
decriminalized to substitution away from alcohol towardmarijuana. These findings conflict
somewhat with those of Johnston, O'Malley, and Bachman(1987) based on the 1975
through 1980 Monitoring the Future surveys of high school seniors and theirsubsequent
followups. They find that marijuana consumption and attitudes towardsmarijuana among
youths and young adults are little changed in the earlyyears after decriminilization in the
seven states which decriminalized marijuana during their sample.
This paper adds to the limited econometric literatureaddressing the question of
substitution between marijuana and alcohol. Youth drinking andheavy drinking, taken
from the 1982 and 1989 Monitoring the Futuresurveys, are estimated as functions of the
2price of alcohol, legal drinking ages, and the price of marijuana. In addition, the
probability of a youth traffic accident, an outcome related to both alcohol and drug abuse,
is estimated. Finally, state level youth motor vehicle accident rates are examined using
data from the Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS).
II. Youth fticohol Consumption
& Analytical Framework
The model employed in this study is based on Siegel's (1989) hypothesis that
individuals consume drugs and alcohol in an attempt at mood alteration. Thus, an
individual's utility at any given time is assumed to be a function of that person's level of
"intoxication" (I), as well as a composite of other consumption goods (X):
(1) U = u(l, X),
where u > 0 and u c 0, i=l,X.
Intoxication is produced by consuming alcohol (A), marijuana (M), and/or other
drugs (0) each of which have positive but diminishing marginal productivity:
(2) I = l(A, M, D).
Maximizing utility, subjectto the intoxication production function and an appropriate
3budget constraint yields the demands for alcohol, marijuana, and other drugs:
(3) A = A(PA, P, P0, P, V, 4
(4) M = M(PMP A' DP P. Y Z),
and:
(5) D = D(PQ, P, P, P. Y1 4
where A, M' P0. and P are the prices of aicohol, marijuana, other drugs, and other
goods, respectively, Y represents the youth's income, and Z is a vector which captures
the youth's tastes and productive efficiency.
B. Data
Alternative versions of equation (3) are estimated below using data on youth
alcohol consumption taken from the 1982 and 1989 Monitoring the Futuresurveys of high
school seniors. These surveys, described in detail by Johnston, et al., (1987), focuson
the use of illegal drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes, and are conducted in thespring of the
youth's senior year. These data are collected directly from the students. Parents were
not present during the interviews and were not informed about theresponses of their
children. As part of a special agreement, variables measuring youth alcoholconsumption
were made available as part of a restricted data set which includes identifiers for each
4youth's county of residence.1 In addition, a variety of socioeconomic and demographic
information was provided.
Three alternative measures of the frequency of youth alcohol consumption were
constructed from the categorical measures obtained in the surveys.2 The distribution of
these measures, the construction of which is described below, is presented in Table 1.
The first consumption frequency measures looks at alcohol consumption during
the previous year and is measured as follows: abstainers are defined as youths with no
drinking occasions in the past year; infrequent drinkers are defined as youths with
between I and 9 drinking occasions in the past year; fairly frequent drinkers are defined
as youths with 10 to 39 drinking occasions in the past year; and frequent drinkers are
defined as youths with 40 or more drinking occasions in the past year. The dependent
variable indicating the frequency of alcohol consumption in the past year is defined as
0, 1, 2, and 3 for abstainers, infrequent drinkers, fairly frequent drinkers, and frequent
drinkers, respectively.
The second captures drinking in the past 30 days, and is defined as 0 for
abstainers (no drinking occasions in the past 30 days). I for infrequent drinkers (1 to 5
drinking occasions in the past 30 days), 2 for fairly frequent drinkers (6 to 9 drinking
occasions in the past 30 days), and 3 for frequent drinkers (10 or more drinking
'Unfortunately,individual level data on marijuana and other drug consumption is unavailable in the
restricted versions of the Monitoring the Future data sets provided to the authors by the University of
Michigan's Institute for Social Research.
2Moredetailed alcohol specific information is collected in five or six additional questionnaires, each of
which is completed by a fraction of the total sample. These data include beverage specific alcohol
consumption, attitudes towards alcohol, and various other measures.
5occasions in the past 30 days).
The final drinking variable is an indicator of heavy drinking. This variable is defined
as one if the youth had at least one drinking occasion in the two weeks prior to the
survey in which he/she consumed five or more drinks, and is defined as zero otherwise.
The alcoholic beverage prices are taken from the quarterly reports of the American
Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association (ACCRA). The ACCRA surveys between
200 and 300 cities quarterly and collects information on the prices of a number of
consumer goods, including beer, wine, and distilled spirits.3 In addition to prices, the
ACCRA constructs a city specific cost-of-living index for each of the cities in its quarterly
reports. The results presented below use the price of beer as the measure of alcoholic
beverage prices. The beer price is chosen since beer is the most heavily consumed
alcoholic beverage and because beer is the beverage of choiceamong youths.' The
ACCRA beer price and city specific cost-of-living index are matched to thesurveys by
county in each of the first two quarters of 1982 and 1989. Similarly, the quarterly
national Consumer Price Index for the first two quarters of 1982 and 1989 is added to the
In 1982, prices areobtained for a 750m1bottleofSeagram's 7-Crown,a 6-pack of Budweiser or Schlitz,
and a 750mJ bottle of Paul Masson Chablis. In 1989, thereports include prices of a 1 literbottleof J&B
Scotch, a 6-pack of Budweiser of Schlitz, and a 1.5 liter bottle of Paul Masson Chablis. A careful effort was
made to construct a standardized series of prices for beer, wine, and distilled spirits. Detailed information
on the construction of this series is available from the authors.
All equations presented below were also estimated using a weightedaverage price of beer, wine, and
spirits, or the beer tax as alternative measures of alcoholic beverage prices. These results, which are similar
to those obtained for beer prices, are available uponrequest.
'The price assigned to each youth in eachquarter is the price in the ACCRA survey city nearest the
youth's county of residence. All equations presented below were reestimated using subsamples of the MTF
surveys based on the quality of the price match. The results obtained for these subsainpies were consistent
with those obtained in the full samples and are availableupon request
6survey data. Real beer prices are theconstructed by deflating the quarterly prices by
bath the national CPI and the ACCRA cost-of-living index and then taking the simple
average of the resulting real prices for the firstand second quarters.
The average minimum legal drinking age for low alcohol beer is added to the
survey data as an additional measure of the full price of alcoholic beverages.' While
almost all youths surveyed are below 18 years of age, and thus unable to legally
purchase alcoholic beverages in any state, youths residing in states with higher minimum
ages will face greater difficulty in obtaining alcoholic beverages than their counterparts
in states where the legal age is lower.
In addition to the own-state minimum legal drinking age, a dichotomous indicator
equal to one if the youth resides in a county within 25 miles of a state with a lower legal
age is added to the data. This variable is equal to zero if the youth does not live in a
county within 25 miles of another state or if the drinking age in the youth's state of
residence is as low or lower than that in nearby states. The inclusion of this variable is
an attempt to capture potential border crossing by youths from high age states to nearby
lower age states to obtain alcohol.'
Two variables are added to the data to capture the full price of marijuana. The first
'Theminimum legal drinking age is the weighted average of the legal ages in place during the first two
quarters of the year in which the youth is surveyed. The construction of this variable accounts for the
grandfather clauses many states adopted when raising their legal ages for all alcoholic beverages to 21 years
to comply with the Federal Uniform Drinking Age Act of 1984. While all states had complied with this law
by 1989, grandfather clauses in some states kept the effective legal age below 21 years in some states until
mid-1989.Similarvariables were constructed for high alcohol content beer and for distilled spirits. The
choice of the drinking age variable had little impact on the resulting estimates.
1Thisvariable takes on a value of zero for all youths in 1989 since the grandfather clauses which keep
effective drinking ages in some states below 21 apply to state residents only. Hence, this variable is omitted
from the equations estimated using the 1989 sample only.
7is a dichotomous indicator which is equal to one if marijuana possession is decriminalized
in the state in which the youth resides and is equal to zero otherwise.Aithough the
possession and use of marijuana is not fully legal in states which have decriminaiized it,
the expected penalties are well below those in states wheremarijuana remains
criminalized. Thus, marijuana consumption is expected to be higher in stateswhich have
decriminalized.If marijuana and alcohol are substitutes for one another, thenyouths
residing in states which have decriminalized marijuana are expected to drink less than
youths in states where the penalties for marijuana possession and/oruse are much
higher.
The second variable is a measure of themoney price of marijuana. These data
come from the Drug Enforcement Agency's System to Retrieveinformation from Drug
Evidence (STRIDE) database. Prices for both commercialgrade marijuana (the dominant
strain of mariluana in U.S. markets) and sinsemilla(a more potent strain of marijuana) are
reported at both the wholesale and retail levels. The wholesaleprices are reported in
dollars per pound, while the retail pricesare reported in dollars per ounce.
There are several problems with using thesemarijuana price data in this research.
First, the prices are reported for at most 19major metropolitan areas. To match the price
data with the survey data, thefollowing strategy was employed: if the youth resides in
a county which includes a city in the STRIDEdatabase, then the price in that city is used
for the marijuana price (this is considereda "perfect' match); if there is no "perfect'
match, then the price in the nearest city within thesame state from the STRIDE database
to the youth's county of residence is usedas the marijuana price (two levels are defined
Bfor the quality of this match - a "border match is one where the STRIDE city is in a
county which borders on the youth's county of residence, while a "state level" match is
one where the price is for a city within the same state butisnot a "perfect' or "border
match); if there is no city in the STRIDE data that is also in the youth's state of residence,
then the price from the STRIDE city nearest the youth's county of residence is used as
the rnarUuana price (the quality of this match is also defined at two levels - a "nearby"
match is defined as one where the price is from a city within 50 miles of the youth's
county of residence), while the "poorest' match is defined for cities which are more than
50 miles from and not in the state as the youth's county of residence. Estimates using
subsamples of the data based on the quality of the price match, as well as estimates for
the full sample, are presented below.8
A second problem with the marijuana price data is that the data are available only
for the fourth quarter of 1988 and the fourth quarter of 1989. Price data for 1982 were
not obtained in the data graciously made available by Paul Taubman for this research.
Thus, all equations estimated which include marijuana prices use only the 1989 cross-
section (or a subsample of this survey). A simple average of the 1988 and 1989 fourth
quarter prices is used as the price of marijuana for the 1989 sample (surveyed in the
spring of 1989)?
Inaddition to the estimates presented below, additional estimates were obtained for more restricted
subsamples. In general, the estimates obtained from the more resiricted, much smaller samples are similar
to, albeit less statistically significant than, the estimates presented here. These estimates are available on
request. Also, due to the problems in assigning appropriate local marijuana prices, these prices are not
deflated by the local cost-of-living index from the ACCRA data.
Allequationswere also estimated using the 1988 price or the 1989 price as the price of marijuana.
The results for these variables are comparable to those presented below and are available on request.
9A third problem with the marijuana price data is that they are reported as a range
of values rather than as a single value. For example, the national average price of
commercial grade marijuana at the wholesale level in the fourth quarter of 1988 is
reported as $350-si ,800. While the ranges reported for the city specific prices are
somewhat narrower, there is still a large range of prices reported for wholesale and retail
commercial grade and sinsemilla maruana in each city. The results presented in this
paper use the midpoint of the range reported in the STRIDE data as the price of
marijuana.
There is clearly substantial measurement error in the marijuanamoney price data.
For example, one would expect that the alternative price measures should berelatively
highly correlated, since each is likely to be related to drug enforcement efforts and other
factors which would be expected to influence price.It is somewhat comforting to note
that the correlation between the wholesale prices for commercialgrade and sinsemilla
maruana is 0.45, while the correlation between the wholesale and retail prices of
commercial grade marijuana is also 0.45. More disturbing is the observation that the
correlation between the retail prices of the two types of marijuana isonly 0.15 and that
the correlation between the wholesale and retailprices of sinsemilla is -0.002." This
suggests that the retail price of sinsemilla may be measured with the mosterror, since
it is neither correlated with its own wholesaleprice nor with the retail price of commercial
'° Inaddition to using the midpoint of the range of prices reported, alternativeestimates were obtained
using the minirnuni and maximum values for the range of prices. The results obtained using these
alternative measures were generally similar to those presented below andare available upon request.
These correlation coefficients were obtained based on the prices assigned to the fullsample, as
described above. Similar values are obtained in thesubsamples as well as in the raw data.
10grade marijuana as would be expected. While the money price of marijuana is measured
with substantial error, the other measure of the full price of marijuana, the
decriminalization indicator, is more reliable. Thus, any conclusions made below on the
substitutability or complementarity of marijuana and alcohol among youths will not be
based solely on a variable measured with error. Finally, reliable estimates of other illegal
drug prices were unavailable. As a result, a potential omitted variables bias is introduced,
which may be particularly problematic if the prices of other illegal drugs are correlated
with the marijuana prices which are included. This is likely to be the case since the prices
of other illegal drugs will be influenced by the same enforcement and other factors which
affect the price of marijuana. Again, this is less likely to be a problem with the estimates
obtained for the decriminalization indicator, since all other illegal drugs are criminalized
in all states.12
Several independent variables were constructed from the wealth of socioeconomic
and demographic information collected in the surveys. These include indicators of sex,
race (black, and other), and work status (part-time and fufl-time),as well as the youth's
age. Real weekly income is created by deflating the youth's nominal weekly income data
collected in the survey by the local cost-of-living index and the national CPL In addition,
some of the specifications presented below include indicators of religious participation
(infrequent and frequent attendance at religious services). It is thought that those who
are more committed to their religion (as measured by more frequent attendance) will be
12 Futureresearch will make use of variables measuring the mandatory minimum penalties associated
with both the possession and manufacture/distribution of all illegal drugs, as well as illegal drug prices
consuucted from the STRIDE data.
11less likely to drink heavily. Finally, in all equations estimated for the combined 1982 and
1989 sample, a dichotomous indicator equal to 1 for youths surveyed in 1982 is included.
C. Results
Ordered probit estimates of the frequency of alcohol consumption in the pastyear
and in the past thirty days are presented in columns I and 2, respectively, of Tables 2
and 3 below. Dichotomous probit estimates for the probability of at least one heavy
drinking incident in the past two weeks are presented in column 3 of these tables. Panel
A of Table 2 presents estimates using the combined 1982 and 1989sample for equations
which exclude the money price of marijuana. Panel A of Table 3presents estimates using
the 1 989 sample only of equations which include each of the four alternativemarijuana
money prices. In addition, Panel B of Table 4 contains estimates for a subsample of the
1989 sample based on the quality of the marijuana price match.13 Panel B of Table2,
for comparison purposes, contains estimates ofequations excluding the money price of
marijuana for the 1989 sample only. Each table presents the coefficient estimates for
beer prices, the minimum legal drinkingage, the dichotomous indicator of a lower border
drinking age (pooled sample only), the dichotomous indicator formarijuana
" Therestrictedsample is limited to observationswhere the marijuana price assigned to the youth is
for a city from the STRiDE data which is in the same state in which theyouth resides. In most cases, this
city is relatively dose to the youth's county of residence1 implying that theprice in that city should be a
reasonably good measw-e of the price the youth faces for marijuana. Observations whereprices are from
a city in the STRIDE data which is not in the youth's state of residence aredropped in the restricted sample.
Even if the youth lives near the city from which theprice is taken, the assigned price may not be a good
measure of the price the youth faces if the drug enforcement activities in his/her stateare quite different
from those in the state from which the price is taken.
12decriminalization, and, where included, the money price of marijuana.1'
In nearly every equation estimated, the coefficient of the real beer price is negative
and statisticaliy significant at the ten percent significance level, withmany significant at
the one percent level. The only exceptions to this are some of the equations using the
1 989 sample which include the wholesale price of sinsemilla as the price ofmarijuana.
In general, these results support the findings of the substantial economics literature
describing the negative relationship between youth alcohol consumption and the prices
of alcoholic beverages (for example, see thesummary by Grossman, Chaloupka, Saffer,
and Laixuthai, forthcoming).
Furthermore, these estimates indicate that the effects of price on consumption are
not limited to infrequent drinkers, but that fairly frequent and frequent drinkersas well as
heavy drinking among youths falls as price rises. This is clearly shown by thenegative
significant coefficients estimated for the beer price in the probability of heavy drinking
equations. The coefficients obtained from the ordered probit estimation for the frequency
of drinking in the past year and drinking in the past month are somewhatmore difficult
to interpret. The negative and significant estimates obtained for price indicate thatan
increase in the beer price will lead to a reduction in the number ofyouths in the most
frequent drinking categories (40 or more drinking occasions in the pastyear or ten or
more drinking occasion in the past month). Similarly, these estimates imply that the
number of youths who do not drink would rise in response to an increase in beer prices.
All equations also include an intercept, the indicators of gender, race, work status, and religious
participation, as wetl as the youth's real weekly income and age, as described above. The pooled sample
also includes the dichotomous year indicator for 1982. These results are availableupon request.
13However, no clear conclusions for the number of infrequent or fairly frequent drinkers can
be drawn directly from the estimates (for example, while some fairly frequent drinkers will
reduce consumption in response to the price increase, some formerly frequent drinkers
may end up as fairly frequent drinkers, leaving the net effect unclear). The results from
the policy simulations presented in the next section will shed some light on the impact of
prices and other variables on these groups.
Similarly, the impact of higher minimum legal drinking ages on both the frequency
of alcohol consumption and the probability of heavy drinking is alsonegative and
significant in most of the estimated equations. In addition, the indicator for youths who
live near a state with a lower legal age than that in theirown state is positive and highly
significant as expected. These estimates imply that increases in the minimumlegal
drinking age increase the 'cost" to youths ol obtaining alcohol and,consequently, lead
to reductions in both the frequency of youth alcohol consumption and theprobability of
heavy drinking among youths. However, states which increase their own minimumlegal
drinking ages above those in nearby states (as happened throughout the late 1970's and
early 1980's) can expect at least some young residents to leave thestate to obtain
alcohol. Thus, while overall youth alcoholconsumption may be lower as the result of
higher drinking ages, drinking and driving by youthsmay actually rise when differences
in own and nearby state drinkingages increase. This potential consequence of higher
drinking ages in some states was eliminated when all states raised theirlegal ages to 21
years to comply with the Uniform Drinking Age Act. This possibility will be examined
below.
14equal to zero otherwise.'6 The independent variables included in the estimation of this
equation are identical to those included in the alcohol demand equations described
above,
A pooled time-series of state cross-sections for the 48 contiguous states of the
U.S. covering the years from 1975 through 1988 is used to examine the effects of alcohol
and marijuana prices on the probability of a fatal youth motor vehicle accident.
Motor vehicle accident fatality rates are the most commonly used empirical
measure of intoxicated driving available. While not all motor vehicle fatalities are the
results of drunk and/or "drugged" driving, there is a strong correlation between the two
measures. During this time period, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) estimates that alcohol was involved in over half of these deaths, and that this
percentage is much higher for people under the age of 25. Owens, et al., (1983), and
Johnson and White (1989) present evidence that marijuana use could also play a role in
at least some motor vehicle accident fatalities.
Three alternative fatality rates, based on the information contained in the NHTSA's
Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) database are constructed for 18 through 20 year
olds, and for 15 through 24 year olds. The first is the total fatality rate for the two age
categories. While this certainly includes non-intoxicated fatalities, it is a useful measure
for examining the overall impacts of policies related to drug and alcohol use. The two
remaining fatality measures are limited to drivers only and are constructed in an attempt
e Thesurvey includescontinuous informationon the number of motor vehicle accidents, with an upper
limit of four or more accidents. However, almost no youth report more than one accident, so nonzero
responses are collapsed into a single category indicating at least one accident in the past year.
23(1984), for example).15 Instead, this finding implies that high school seniors, many of
whom are likely to have initiated their alcohol and drug use several years earlier, treat
alcohol and marijuana as substitutes for one another.
This conclusion is generally supported by the coefficients obtained for the
alternative measures of marijuana prices. In both the full and restricted 1989 samples1
positive and highly significant coefficients are obtained for the wholesale price of
marijuana (both commercial grade and sinsemilla). The findings for retail marijuana prices
are mixed. The coefficients for the retail price of commercial grade marijuana are always
positive and generally significant, except in the frequency of drinking in the past year
equations where they are positive but insignificant. Retail sinsemilla prices, however, are
estimated to have a negative and generally significant impact on alcohol consumption in
both the full and restricted sample. The findings for both wholesale prices and for the
retail price of commercial grade marijuana can be viewed as more reliable for two
reasons:first, the retail price of sinsemilla appears to be subject to the most
measurement error, as discussed above; and, second, sinsemilla is a much higher priced
strain of marijuana which constitutes only a small part of the market making it less likely
to be used by youths.'°
' Futureresearch willusesome of the longitudinal datacollected aspart of the Monitoring the Future
project to examine the gateway hypothesis.
Kleirnan (1992) describesthe evolution ofthe marijuana market over time, noting that most of the
U.S. market was supplied from foreign sources and that most foreign marijuanaiscommercial grade. I-fe
goes on to note that successful interdiction efforts have led to a much larger domestic supply and that,
combined with improvements in cultivation, this has led to an increase in the potency of marijuana (both
commercial and sinsenjila).
16U. Policy Simulations
As mentioned above, it is difficult to use the ordered probit coefficients to interpret
the effects of changes in the variables of interest on the frequency of drinking. While the
coefficients themselves provide some information, particularly for the top (frequent
drinkers) and bottom (abstainers) categories, the marginal effect of the variable on each
category is more useful. Table 4 presents simulation results which use these marginal
effects to evaluate the impact of changes in various policies on the frequency of youth
drinking and the probability of heavy drinking by youths.1' Each of the cells in Table 4
indicates the percentage change in the number of respondents predicted to fall into each
of the categories as a result of the change in policy being simulated (recall that the
original distributions are presented in Table 1). Panel A of Table 4 contains the simulation
results for the pooled 1982 and 1989 sample, while Panel B contains those for the 1989
sample only. Panels B.1, B.2, B.3, B.4, and B.5 present the results for no marijuana price,
the wholesale commercial grade marijuana price, the wholesale sinsemilla price, the retail
commercial grade marijuana price, and the retail sinsemilla price, respectively.All
simulation results presented are based on the coefficients from the models estimated
using the full samples.
' "Theunderlying model is assumed to be 'r=wx+ e,where Y is alcohol consumption, X contains
determinants of consumption, B are coefficients, and e is an error. However, Y is not observed. What is
observed is Y=0, 1, 2, and 3, when Y￿o, p1sYspz2,and respectively. The probabilities





whereC'isthecumulative standard normal distribution (from Greene, 1990). Simulations are conducted
by changing the appropriate independent variable to reflect the policy under consideration and recomputing
the probabilities based on the estimated coefficients.
17Four alternative policy simulations are presented. The first increases the federal
excise tax on beer to offset the effects of inflation since 1951 (this amounts to a 17.1
percent increase in the average price of beer in the pooled sample and about an 18
percent increase in the 1989 sample, assuming that the tax increase is fully passed on
to consumers). The second simulates the impact of recriminahzation of marijuana in every
state while the third considers marijuana decriminalization in all states. Finally, the fourth
examines the impact of a reduction in the price of marijuana comparable to the increase
in the price of beer associated with the tax increase described above (that is, the price
of marijuana is assumed to fall by 18 percent). This is done to provide some comparison
between the relative responsiveness of young drinkers to changes in beer prices and
marijuana prices.
As the ordered probit coefficients indicated, an increase in the beer tax leads to
significant increases in the number of abstainers while the number of frequent drinkers
or heavy drinkers falls sharply. For example, in the pooled sample, increasing the beer
tax with inflation since 1951 would raise the numbers of abstainers in thepast year and
in the past month by 8.42 percent and 4.35 percent. respectively, whilereducing the
comparable numbers of frequent drinkers by 7.49 percent and 6.57 percent. The number
of fairly frequent drinkers in either the pastyear or past month also falls as a result of this
policy. However, the number of infrequent drinkers in the past year rises by 2.15 percent
while the number of infrequent drinkers in the past month falls slightly.Finally, the
probability of a heavy drinking episode falls by 2.28 percent in response to the large price
increase induced by the tax change. This confirms the findings of other studies
18(Grossman, Coate and Arluck, (1987) and Coate and Grossman (1988), for example)
which find that the impact of increases in alcoholic beverage excise taxes are not limited
to infrequent drinkers, but that frequent drinkers are very responsive to price changes as
well.
Simulating the effects of uniform criminalization of marijuana versus uniform
decriminalization of marijuana proves quite interesting. As indicated by the estimated
coefficients, there is strong evidence that, at least for high school seniors, marijuana and
alcohol could be considered substitutes. Thus, moving from a situation where marijuana
is criminalized everywhere, implying substantial penalties for possession and/or use, to
one where marijuana is decriminalized everywhere, significantly reducing the expected
costs of marijuana use, leads to substitution away from alcohol. Based on the results
from the pooled sample, for example, this change in policy would increase the number
of abstainers in the past year by nearly 12 percent, while reducing the number of frequent
drinkers in the past year by almost 11 percent. The number of infrequent drinkers would
rise by about three percent, while the number of fairly frequent drinkers would ball by
almost four percent. Likewise, the probability of a heavy drinking episode would fall
sharply, by approximately 11.55 percent, in response to this policy shift.
Finally, as shown by most of the estimated marijuana price coefficients, a reduction
in the price of marijuana reduces alcohol consumption, again implying that youths are
substituting the two substances. For example, looking at the changes in drinking in the
past month induced by changes in beer prices and in the retail price of commercial grade
marijuana (perhaps most likely to represent the price youths face for marijuana), one finds
19that an 18 percent increase in the beer price would reduce the number of frequent
drinkers by 6.28 percent while the comparable marijuana price reduction would reduce
the number of frequent drinkers by 2.84 percent. Similarly the number of abstainers in
the past month is predicted to rise by 5.04 percent and 2.24 percent for the changes in
beer prices and marijuana prices, respectively. These estimates suggest that the
responsiveness of youth drinking to a decline in marijuana prices is almost half that
resulting from an increase in beer prices. Other models predict an even larger cross
price effect, providing strong evidence of the substitutability between alcohol and
marijuana among youths. The next section considers the effects of this substitution on
one of these consequences of substance use among youths, driving under the influence
of alcohol and/or drugs.
Ill. DrMng Under the Influence of Drucjs and/or Alcohol
A. Analytical Framework
The underlying model which provides the basis for the empirical analysis of youth
driving under the influence consists of several equations. The first is a technical
relationship in which the probability that a youth is involved in an accident (fatal accident),
ii,is positively related to his/her intoxication while driving, as well as to a vector of
additional variables (1-0 reflecting roadway, traffic, and motor vehicle conditions:
(6) ix = ir(l, 1-0.
20As described in equation (2) above, intoxication is produced by consuming alcohol
marijuana, and/or other drugs. Substituting equation (2) into equation (6) yields a
production function in which the probability of an accident (fatal accident) depends
positively on the consumption of alcohol, marijuana, and other drugs:
(7) it = rr(A, M, D, H).
Finally, a reduced form probability of an accident (fatal accident) equation is obtained by
substituting the demands for alcohol, marijuana, and other drugs equations (3), (4), and
(5) above1 into equation (7):
(8) it = ir(P, PM. D' P,. '1, Z H).
Two versions of equation (8) are estimated. The first uses the Monitoring the
Future data to examine the probability that a youth is involved in a least one traffic
accident in the previous year. In the second, the reduced form equation is aggregated
over youths in each state in each year. The result is an empirically estimable equation
where the probability of a fatal youth motor vehicle accident is measured by the observed
youth motor vehicle accident fatality rate. Both overall and alcohol related youth fatality
rates, constructed from the FARS, are examined.
It is expected that a reduction in the price of marijuana (as the result of a state
decriminalizing marijuana, for example) will lead to an increase in marijuana consumption,
21which, holding alcohol consumption constant, wiH lead to more driving while intoxicated,
and, consequently more youth accidents and fatal accidents. However, based on the
youth alcohol demand equations estimated above, reductions in the price of marijuana
lead to reductions in alcohol consumption as well. The reduced alcohol consumption will
be accompanied by less drinking and driving and, hence, fewer alcohol related accidents
and fatal accidents. Thus, the overafi impact of a drop in marijuana prices on the
probability of an accident (fatal accident) depends not only on the increased marijuana
consumption it induces, but on the substitution away from alcohol which results. Finally,
the net effect will also depend on the relative risks associated with drunk driving
compared to "stoned" driving. For example, Kleiman (1992) suggests that marijuana use
leads to slower, as well as impaired, driving. This would imply that the probability of an
accident might not differ, but that the probability of a fatal accident would be higher when
drunk than when stoned.
B. Data
To look at the impact of alcohol and marijuana prices on the probability of a non-
fatal motor vehicle accident among youths, the 1982 and 1989 surveys of high school
seniors described above are used. The dependent variable in these equations is a
dichotomous variable equal to one if the youth reports driving during at least one motor
vehicle accident in the past year (regardless of responsibility for the accident). and is
22equal to zero otherwise.'6 The independent variables included in the estimation of this
equation are identical to those included in the alcohol demand equations described
above,
A pooled time-series of state cross-sections for the 48 contiguous states of the
U.S. covering the years from 1975 through 1988 is used to examine the effects of alcohol
and marijuana prices on the probability of a fatal youth motor vehicle accident.
Motor vehicle accident fatality rates are the most commonly used empirical
measure of intoxicated driving available. While not all motor vehicle fatalities are the
results of drunk and/or "drugged" driving, there is a strong correlation between the two
measures. During this time period, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) estimates that alcohol was involved in over half of these deaths, and that this
percentage is much higher for people under the age of 25. Owens, et al., (1983), and
Johnson and White (1989) present evidence that marijuana use could also play a role in
at least some motor vehicle accident fatalities.
Three alternative fatality rates, based on the information contained in the NHTSA's
Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) database are constructed for 18 through 20 year
olds, and for 15 through 24 year olds. The first is the total fatality rate for the two age
categories. While this certainly includes non-intoxicated fatalities, it is a useful measure
for examining the overall impacts of policies related to drug and alcohol use. The two
remaining fatality measures are limited to drivers only and are constructed in an attempt
e Thesurvey includescontinuous informationon the number of motor vehicle accidents, with an upper
limit of four or more accidents. However, almost no youth report more than one accident, so nonzero
responses are collapsed into a single category indicating at least one accident in the past year.
23to focus on intoxicated drivers. The first driver specific fatality rate is limited to deaths
which occur between 12:00 a.m. and 3:59 a.m. and is called the night driver fatality rate.
The NHTSA estimates that 75-90 percent of these drivers had been drinking prior to their
deaths. It is suspected that a large number of these drivers may also have been using
illegal drugs (either with or without alcohol). The final fatality rate is an estimated alóohol
involved driver fatality rate constructed from the blood alcohol concentration information
contained in the FAIRS.1' This fatality rate focuses on alcohol use and allows for a
clearer examination of the potential substitution between alcohol and marijuana.
Each fatality rate is computed as the relevant number of motor vehicle accident
deaths divided by the relevant state population. The fatality equation is specified as a
logistic equation. The logistic functional form is ideal since it constrains the fatality rate
to lie between zero and one. The logistic specification is obtained by transforming the
fatality rate to ln[F/(1-F)}, where F is the fatality rate and In is the natural logarithm.
Maddala (1 983) shows that weighted least squares should be used with this logistic
transformation. The weight is [nF(1-F)]', where n is the relevant state population.
Three variables are included as measures of the full price of alcoholic beverages.
The first is the price of alcohol, measured by the excise tax rate on beer. Excise tax data
are the most reliable price data available at the state level during this time period. Beer
tax data were chosen since beer is the most popular alcoholic beverage in the U.S. and
because meaningful wine and distilled spirits taxes are only available for states which
li SeeChaloupka, SaLTer, and Grossman, (1993), for more detailed information on the construction of
the alcohol involved driver fatality rate. SAC data is available since 1977 in the PARS. As a result, the
sample consists of the 48 contiguous states of the U.S. from 1977 through 1988 in all equations estimated
using the alcohol involved driver fatality rate as the dependent variable.
24permit the sale of all alcoholic beverages in licensed establishments. The beer tax
variable is defined as the sum of the Federal and state excise tax rates on a case of 24-
12 ounce containers of beer and is deflated by the national CPI (1982-1984 base year).
The Federal tax had been fixed at 64 cents from 1951 until 1991, when it was doubled
as part of a deficit reduction package. If a state raised its tax during the year, the tax is
computed as the weighted average of the rates in effect throughout the year. State
excise tax rates were taken from the U.S. Brewers Association's annual Brewers Almanac.
The second measure, reflecting availability of alcohol, is the minimum legal drinking
age for low alcohol content beer. The final measure of the full price of alcohol, again
reflecting availability, is the percentage of the state population residing in counties which
prohibit the sale of alcohol, or "dry" counties. These data were obtained from the
Brewers Almanac.
The full price of marijuana is captured by an indicator for states which have
decriminalized marijuana. Decriminalization of marijuana eliminates possible imprisonment
for most first offense possession violations. Oregon, in 1973, was the first state to
decriminalize marijuana. By 1978, 10 other states had followed, substantially reducing the
penalties associated with marijuana possession. Decriminalization, by lowering the
penalties associated with marijuana use, is expected to significantly increase marijuana
consumption. In addition, if alcohol and marijuana are substitutes, then decriminalization
is expected to reduce alcohol consumption. The net effect of decriminalization on motor
vehicle accident fatalities, however, is unclear.
Four other alcohol related variables are included in all equations as measures of
25unobserved exogenous sentiment towards alcohol. For example, anti-alcohol sentiment
should be relatively widespread in states in which religious groups opposing alcohol are
prevalent or in states in which a higher than average fraction of the population reside in
counties prohibiting the sale of alcohol. Thus, variables are defined for the percentages
of the state population who are Mormons, Southern Baptists, other Protestants, and
Catholics. These data were available from the National Council of Churches for 1971 and
1980 only. Estimates for 1975 through 1988 were computed by logarithmic trend.
Real per capita personal income is also included in all equations. Income should
be positively related to the demand for health, as well as to the quality and condition of
motor vehicles, and may be positively related to the demand for alcohol and marijuana.
Thus, the predicted effect of income on fatality rates is ambiguous.
Additionally, five variables are used to control for the probability of a fatal motor
vehicle accident. They are the percentage of highway traffic exceeding 65 milesper hour,
the number of vehicle miles traveled in 100,000's of miles per licensed driver, the fraction
of licensed drivers ages 24 years and under, a dichotomous indicator for states requiring
annual safety inspections of all motor vehicles, and a dichotomous indicator of a
mandatory seat belt use law. The first three of these variables were computed using data
from the Federal Highway Administration's Highway Statistics, and unpublished data
provided by the FHA. The safety inspection indicator was taken from the American
Automobile Association's Digest of Motor Laws. Finally, information on mandatory seat
belt use laws was obtained from communications with the NHTSA.
Vehicle miles per driver reflect motor vehicle use and traffic density and should be
26positively related to fatality rates. According to Peltzman (1975), because young drivers
have a higher demand for risky driving, they are more likely to have an accident than
older drivers. Thus, an increase in the fraction of young drivers should have a positive
effect on fatality rates. Similarly, vehicle speed should also have a positive effect on
fatality rates, with deviation from the average speed also having a positive effect. Thus,
an increase in the percentage of drivers exceeding 65 mph on highways should lead to
higher fatality rates. Likewise, mandatory safety inspections should result in safer vehicles
and, as a result, lower fatal accident rates. Lastly, increased seat belt use resulting from
the mandatory seat belt use laws should reduce the probability of a fatal accident.
Finally, temporal variation in unmeasured variables and other time trends are
modeled by a set of dichotomous variables for each of the years from 1975 through 1987
(1977 through 1987 for the alcohol involved driver rates).
C. Results
Dichotomous probit estimates of the probability of a non-fatal traffic accident, using
the data from the 1982 and 1989 Monitoring the Future surveys are presented in Table
5. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 contain estimates of equations excluding marijuana
money prices for the pooled sample and for the 1989 sample, respectively. Columns 3
through 6 of Table 5 present the estimates for the 1989 sample only from equations
which include alternative measures of the money price of marijuana. Panel A of Table 5
presents the results for the full samples, as defined above, while Panel B contains
estimates for the smaller sample based on more exact marijuana money price matches.
27Only the coefficients for the beer and marijuana price variables, the legal drinking age
measures, and the decriminalization indicator from equations which exclude the religion
variables are shown. All equations, however, include the same set of other independent
variables described above?0
Weighted least squares estimates of youth motor vehicle accident fatality rates are
contained in Table 6. Panel A of Table 6 contains the estimates of the beer tax, drinking
age, and decriminalization coefficients for the 15 through 24 year old fatality rates, with
comparable estimates for 18 through 20 year olds presented in Panel B. Estimates for
the 18 through 20 year old sample are presented to highlight the impact of the minimum
legal drinking age which most affects this age group. Column 1 of Table 6 presents the
results for the total youth motor vehicle accident fatality rates, while columns 2 and 3
contain estimates for the night driver and alcohol involved driver rates, respectively.
Beer prices are found to have a negative and generally significant impact on both
the probability of a non-fatal motor vehicle accident and a fatal motor vehicle accident.
This is true for each of the various samples constructed from the surveys of high school
seniors as well as for each of the alternative age-specific fatality rates constructed from
the FARS data. The finding that youth motor vehicle accident fatality rates are inversely
related to the price of alcoholic beverages is consistent with a number of other studies
which have addressed this issue (see Saffer and Grossman, 1987, and Chaloupka, Saffer,
and Grossman, 1993. for example). However, while expected, this is the first empirical
20This set includes an intercept, dichotomous indicators of gender, race, employment status, and
religious pat-ticipadon, and the youth's reai weekly income and age. The pooled sample also includes a
dichotomous indicator for 1982. Estimates for these variables are available upon request.
28evidence indicating that non-fatal youth motor accidents are also inversely related to
prices.
Drinking ages, however, do not appear to have much of an impact on non-fatal
youth motor vehicle accidents, based on the results presented in Table 5. This was a
somewhat surprising finding given the extensive literature and confirmed by the results
shown in Table 6, which finds that higher minimum legal drinking ages lead to lower
youth motor vehicle accident fatality rates, particularly among 18 through 20 year olds.
For the samples based on the 1989 survey, this finding may be in part due to the fact
that almost every state's drinking age was 21 at this time. However, that doesn'texplain
the unexpected positive and significant effect estimated for thepooled sample.
The estimated coefficients on the decriminalization indicator arenegative and highly
significant in every equation, with the exception of those for the probability of a non-fatal
accident which include the retail price of commercial grade marijuana, wherethey are
negative but insignificant at conventional levels. Similarly, marijuana prices are found to
have a positive and generally significant impact on the probabilitya non-fatal motor
vehicle accident.
D. Policy Simulations
To compare the impact of various alcohol and marijuana related policieson driving
under the influence by youths, policy simulations comparable to those described above
were conducted. The results from these simulations are presented in Tables 7 and 8.
Table 7 contains the predicted changes in the number of youths involved in at leastone
29non-fatal traffic accident in response to the four policy changes. Column 1 of Table 7
presents the policy simulations for the pooled sample, while Column 2 presents those
based on the 1 989 survey only excluding the money price of marijuana. Columns 3-6
contain the results when the four alternative money prices of marijuana are included in
the models for the 1989 sample (the wholesale and retail prices of commercial grade
marijuana (3 and 5 respectively) and sinsemilla (4 and 6 respectively)). All predictions
contained in Table 7 are based on the coefficients estimated for the full samples. Table
8 contains the estimated percentage change in the youth motor vehicle accident fatality
rate associated with the change in policy being simulated as well as the estimate change
in the number of fatalities in each category in the final year of the sample (1988) resulting
from the policy change.
Large increases in the excise tax on beer will lead to substantial reductions in both
non-fatal and fatal motor vehicle accidents among youths. The approximately 17 percent
increase in the price of beer induced when the federal tax is increased to offset the
effects of inflation since 1951 leads to an almost six percent reduction in the probability
of a non-fatal accident in the pooled sample of high school seniors. Similarly, maintaining
the real value of the beer tax at its 1951 level during the period from 1975 through 1988
would have reduced fatal motor vehicle accidents by over 16 percent among 15 through
24 year olds and nearly 20 percent among 18 to 20 year olds. In 1988, these estimates
imply that 2.288 lives would have been saved in the 15 through 24 year old group.
A reduction in marijuana prices, which is expected to increase marijuana
consumption but reduce drinking based on the results described above, leads to a
30significant drop in the probability of a non-fatal motor vehicle accidentamong high school
seniors. The estimated reductions in this probability for the 18percent fall in each of the
four marijuana prices used in this paper range from -2.25percent up to -7.25 percent.
This implies that the net effect of the substitution towardsmarijuana on the probability of
an accident induced by the drop in the price of marijuana isnegative. That is, the
increase in the probability of a non-fatal accident resulting fromgreater marijuana use is
more than offset by the drop in this probability resulting from lessdrinking and driving
and, perhaps, less use of other intoxicating substances anddriving.
This conclusion is further supported by the estimatedeffects of marijuana
decriminalization on the probabilities of both non-fatal and fatalmotor vehicle accidents
among youths. Going from a nationwide policy criminalizirig marijuana toone where
marijuana is decriminalized everywhere leads to about a 7.5percent drop in the
probability of a non-fatal accident in the pooled sample ofhigh school seniors.
Somewhat larger reductions are estimated in most of thespecifications for the 1989
sample only. Similarly, this change in policy is predicted to reduced thefatal accident
rate by almost 5.5 percent among 15 through 24year olds and just over six percent
among 18 to 20 year olds. In 1988, an estimated 224 fewer youth andyoung adult lives
(ages 15-24) were lost in fatal traffic accidents in the states whichhad decriminalized
marijuana. Decriminalization in all other states, based on theseestimates, would have
saved an additional 549 lives in this agegroup. Again, this is expected to be the result
of substitution towards marijuana andaway from alcohol and other intoxicating
substances in the states where the penalties associated withmarijuana use are much
31lower.
IV. Conclusions
The findings on youth alcohol use suggest that successful marijuana related efforts
in the 'War on Drugs', which can be expected to reduce the supply of marijuana and,
hence, increase its price will not only lead to less marijuana consumption, but will have
the unintended consequence of raising alcohol consumption (at least among youths).
This is consistent with DiNardo and Lemieux's (1992) finding that increased minimum
legal drinking ages, while reducing alcohol consumption among youths, had the
unintended consequence of leading to an almost one-for-one increase in marVuana use.
The findings related to youth motor vehicle accidents suggest that reductions in
the full price of marijuana, resulting from either lower money prices and/or reduced legal
sanctions for possession/use, lead youths to substitute away from alcoholic beverages
and other intoxicating substances towards marijuana. Furthermore, the subsequent
reductions in the consequences of drunken driving (non-fatal and fatal accidents) and
driving under the influence of other substances more than offset the increases in the
consequences of driving under the influence of marijuana. Similarly, an increase in the
full price of beer, resulting, for example, from the increased taxation of alcoholic
beverages and/or higher minimum legal drinking ages, lowers beer consumption and
raises marijuana consumption. This would be expected to reduce drunken driving, but
to raise "stoned" driving. The net effect of the beer price increase, however, is to reduce
the probabilities of non-fatal and fatal youth motor vehicle accidents.
32Improved traffic outcomes may be the result of more careful and/or slower driving
on the part of youths driving under the influence of marijuana as compared to those who
are drinking and driving (as suggested by Kieiman), or it may be that youths are less
likely to drive after consuming marijuana than they are after drinking or that marijuana
consumption impairs driving less than alcohol consumption. Whether it's one of these
or any other reason, the results presented here imply that the combination of higher full
prices for alcoholic beverages and a lower full price for marijuana will reduce the
probability of youth motor vehicle accidents, both fatal and non-fatal. This is consistent
with Model's (1993 and 1991) findings, based on drug and alcohol relatedemergency
room admissions as well as violent crime rates, that the substitution away from alcohol
and other drugs towards marijuana resulting from reductions in the full price ofmarijuana
(due to decriminalization) leads to net reductions in some of the consequences of drug
and alcohol abuse.
The growing body of research in this wea suggest that decriminalization, or even
legalization, of marijuana only, which can be expected to reduce the full price of
marijuana, would almost certainly lead to increased marijuana consumption, but at the
same time reduce several of the consequences associated with all drug use, including
motor vehicle accidents, other medical emergencies, and violent crime. In addition, this
would free up resources for stronger enforcement efforts towards remaining illegal drugs.
The appropriateness of such a policy clearly depends on the harmfulconsequences of
alcohol, maruana, and other illegal drug use.
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Heavy Drinking in Past 2 Weeks
No Heavy Drinking Episodes








Ordered and Dichotomous Probit Estimates of Drinking Frequency
Beer Prices, Drinking Ages, and Marijuana Decriminalization
Heavy
Drinking Drinking Drinking in
in the Past in the Past Past Two





Beer Price, -11.085 -8.832 -4.783
(-5.24) (-4.06) (-1.84)
Minimum Legal Drinking Age -0.009 -0.018 -0.011
(-1.10) (-2.24) (-1.10)
Lower Border Age 0.159 0.133 0.108
(6.86) (5.68) (3.90)
Marijuana Decriminalization -0.071 -0.096 -0.1 11
(-4.59) (-6.06) (-5.82)
Chi-Squared 3247.41 2643.43 2347.99
Panel B:
1989 Sample
Beer Price -10.507 -8.737 -8.444
(-3.78) (-3.04) (-2.45)
Minimum Legal Drinking Age -0.202 -0.197 -0.174
(-3.05) (-2.89) (-2.16)
Marijuana Decriminalization -0.073 -0.084 -0.088
(-3.22) (-3.60) (-3.16)
Chi-Squared 1337.01 1092.02 967.77
n=25,430, 12,597
37Table 3
Ordered and Dichotomous Probit Estimates of Drinking Frequency
1989 High School Seniors
Beer and Marijuana Prices, Drinking Ages, and Marijuana Decriminalization
Heavy
Drinking Drinking Drinking in
in the Past in the Past Past Two
Variable Year Month Weeks
Panel A:
Full Sample
Beer Price -8.281 -6.622 -5.635
(-2.95) (-2.28) (-1.62)
Minimum Legal Drinking Age -0.152 -0.152 -0.117
(-2.28) (-2.20) (-1.43)
Marijuana Decriminalization -0.052 -0.065 -0.064
(-2.29) (-2.74) (-2.27)
Wholesale Commercial Grade 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003
Marijuana Price (5.83) (5.25) (5.59)




Beer Price -5.307 -7.292 -8.679
(-1.60) (-2.12) (-2.12)
Minimum Legal Drinking Age -0.064 -0.131 -0.101
(-0.91) (-1.80) (-1.16)
Marijuana Decriminalization -0.012 -0.091 -0.119
(-0.34) (-2.51) (-2.74)
Wholesale Commercial Grade 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004
Marijuana Price (3.41) (4.02) (5.12)
Chi-Squared 705.17 586.77 583.54
n=12,597; 6,272
38Table 3 (continued)
Beer and Maruana Prices, Drinking Ages, and Marijuana Decriminalization
Heavy
Drinking Drinking Drinking in
in the Past in the Past Past Two
Variable Year Month Weeks
Panel A:
Full Sample
Beer Price -5.022 -1.578 1.360
(-1.61) (.0.49) (0.35)
Minimum Legal Drinking Age -0.203 -0.201 -0.180
(-3.07) (-2.94) (-2.22)
Marijuana decriminalization -0.095 -0.113 -0.129
(-4.07) (-4.70) (-4.47)
Wholesale Sinsemilla Marijuana 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002
Price (3.91) (4.92) (5.55)




Beer Price 0.979 -0.078 1.204
(0.25) (-0.02) (0.25)
Minimum Legal Drinking Age -0.104 -0.180 -0.172
(-1.48) (-2.47) (-1.98)
Marijuana Decriminalization -0.051 -0.138 -0.187
(-1.46) (-3.81) (-4.29)
Wholesale Sinsemilla Marijuana 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002
Price (3.48) (3.86) (4.41)
Chi-Squared 705.61 585.52 576.75
n=12,597; 6,272
39Table 3 (continued)
Beer and Marijuana Prices, Drinking Ages, and Marijuana Decriminalization
Heavy
Drinking Drinking Drinking in
in the Past in the Past Past Two
Variable Year Month Weeks
Panel A:
Full Sample
Beer Price -10.355 -9.063 -9.221
(-3.70) (-3.13) (-2.67)
Minimum Legal Drinking Age -0.087 -0.074 -0.013
(-1.24) (-1.02) (-0.16)
Marijuana Decriminalization 0.015 0.014 0.034
(0.54) (0.47) (0.97)
Retail Commercial Grade 0.0001 0.001 0.002
Marijuana Price (0.22) (2.08) (3.13)




Beer Price -5.982 -8.082 -9.837
(-1 .80) (-2.36) (-2.41)
Minimum Legal Drinking Age -0.080 -0.118 -0.055
(-1.03) (-1.48) (-0.58)
Marijuana Decriminalization -0.022 -0.079 -0.082
(-0.52) (-1.80) (-1.55)
Retail Commercial Grade 0.0003 0.001 0.002
Marijuana Price (0.38) (1.40) (2.35)
Chi-Squared 693.65 572.53 562.82
n=11,281; 6,272
40Table 3 (concluded)










































































Drinking Frequency and the Probability of Heavy Drinking
Heavy
Drinking Drinking Drinking in
in the Past in the Past Past Two






Abstainers +8.42% +4.35% +1.25%
Infrequent Drinkers +2.15% -0.65% --
Fairly Frequent Drinkers -2.71% -3.78% --
Frequent (Heavy) Drinkers -7.49% -6.57% -2.28%
Nationwide Criminalization
Abstainers -3.44% -3.11% -1.93%
Infrequent Drinkers -0.97% + 0.38% --
Fairly Frequent Drinkers + 1.10% +2.74% --
Frequent (Heavy) Drinkers +3.35% +4.45% +3.53%
Nationwide Decriminalization
Abstainers +8.31% +7.36% +4.38%
Infrequent Drinkers +2.13% -1.17%
Fairly Frequent Drinkers -2.67% -6.37% --









Drinking Drinking Drinking in
in the Past in the Past Past Two






Abstainers +7.68% +3.97% +2.01%
Infrequent Drinkers +1.54% -1.14% --
Fairly Frequent Drinkers -3.20% -4.27% --
Frequent (Heavy) Drinkers -7.69% -6.94% -4.35%
Nationwide Criminajizatiori
Abstainers -3.29% -2.42% -1.37%
Infrequent Drinkers -0.74% +0.64% --
Fairly Frequent Drinkers +1.38% +2.64% --
Frequent (Heavy) Drinkers +355% +4.45% +2.96%
Nationwide Decriminalization
Abstainers +8.10% +5.85% +3.19%
Infrequent Drinkers +1.62% -1.72% --
Fairly Frequent Drinkers -3.37% -6.24% --









Drinking Drinking Drinking in
in the Past in the Past Past Two







Abstainers +6.02% +3.01% +1.35%
Infrequent Drinkers +1.23% -0.85% —
Fairly Frequent Drinkers -2.51% -3.25% —
Frequent (Heavy) Drinkers -6.11% -5.30% -2.92%
Nationwide Criminalization
Abstainers -2.37% -1.87% -1.00%
Infrequent Drinkers -0.53% +0.50% --
Fairly Frequent Drinkers +0.99% +2.04% —
Frequent (Heavy) Drinkers +2.54% +3.42% +2.16%
Nationwide Decriminalization
Abstainers +5.78% +4.50% +2.33%
Infrequent Drinkers +1.19% -1.30% --
Fairly Frequent Drinkers -2.42% -4.83% —
Frequent (Heavy) Drinkers -5.87% -7.81% -5.05%
Marijuana Price Reduction
Abstainers +6.83% +3.98% +2.65%
Infrequent Drinkers +1.39% -1.14% —
Fairly Frequent Drinkers -2.85% -4.28% --




















Abstainers +3.59% +0.71% -0.33%
Infrequent Drinkers +0.72% -0.20%
Fairly Frequent Drinkers -1.s6% -0.77%
Frequent (Heavy) Drinkers -3.77% -1.28% +0.71%
Nationwide Criminalization
Abstainers -4.22% -3.27% -2.01%
Infrequent Drinkers -0.92% +0.85% --
Fairly Frequent Drinkers +1.85% +3.57% --
Frequent (Heavy) Drinkers +4.69% +6.05% +4.35%
Nationwide Decriminalization
Abstainers +10.50% +7.88% +4.62%
Infrequent Drinkers +1.94% -2.38% —
Fairly Frequent Drinkers -4.54% -8.42% —
Frequent (Heavy) Drinkers -10.54% -13.36% -10.01%
Marijuana Price Reduction
Abstainers +4.81% +3.97% +2.79%
Infrequent Drinkers +0.95% -1.14% —
Fairly Frequent Drinkers -2.09% -4.28% --




Drinking Drinking Drinking in
in the Past in the Past Past Two







Abstainers +7.72% +5.04% +2.29%
Infrequent Drinkers +1.65% -0.10% --
Fairly Frequent Drinkers -o% -3.29% —
Frequent (Heavy) Drinkers -7.52% -6.28% -4.66%
Nationwide Criminalization
Abstainers +0.57% +0.38% +0.43%
Infrequent Drinkers +0.13% -0.00% --
Fairly Frequent Drinkers -0.22% -0.25% —
Frequent (Heavy) Drinkers -0.58% -0.50% -0.88%
Nationwide Decriminalization
Abstainers -1.81% -1.23% -1.40%
Infrequent Drinkers -0.42% +0.00% —
Fairly Frequent Drinkers +0.72% +0.80% —
Frequent (Heavy) Drinkers +1.88% +1.59% +2.64%
Marijuana Price Reduction
Abstainers +0.31% +2.24% +1.81%
Infrequent Drinkers +0.07% -0.03% —
Fairly Frequent Drinkers -0.12% -1.46% —




Drinking Drinking Drinking in
in the Past in the Past Past Two







Abstainers +7.02% + 3.77% + 1.98%
Infrequent Drinkers +1.51% -0.98% —
Fairly Frequent Drinkers -2.78% -3.91% —
Frequent (Heavy) Drinkers -6.90% -6.43% -4.10%
Nationwide Criminalizatiori
Abstainers -2.07% -1.68% -1.11%
Infrequent Drinkers -0.49% +0.40% —
Fairly Frequent Drinkers +0.82% + 1.76% —
Frequent (Heavy) Drinkers +2.17% +2.99% +2.30%
Nationwide Decriminalization
Abstainers +4.58% +3.65% +2.35%
Infrequent Drinkers +1.01% -0.95% —
Fairly Frequent Drinkers -1.82% -3.79% —
Frequent (Heavy) Drinkers -4.57% -6.23% -4.89%
Marijuana Price Reduction
Abstainers -5.32% -3.49% -1 .49%
Infrequent Drinkers -i .30% +0.78% —
Fairly Frequent Drinkers +2.12% +3.52% --
Frequent (Heavy) Drinkers +5.71% +6.03% +3.10%
47Table 5
Probit Estimates of the Probability of a Motor Vehicle Accident




and 1989 No Marijuana Marijuana
Variable Samples Prices Prices
PanelA
Beer Price -10.333 -10.394 -8.689
(-3.78) (-2.95) (-2.44)
Minimum Legal Drinking Age 0.030 -0.067 -0.034
(2.89) (-0.79) (-0.39)
Lower Border Age 0.001
(0.05)
Marijuana Decriminalization -0.053 -0.112 -0.098
(-2.66) (-3.90) (-3.38)
Maruana Price --—- 0.0002
CM-Squared 929.80 399.22 408.82
Panel B
Beer Price -9.973 -9.660 -8.076
(-3.64) (-2.73) (-2.26)
Minimum Legal Drinking Age 0.031 -0.063 -0.031
(2.94) (-0.74) (-0.36)
Lower Border Age 0.001 -—-
(0.05) -—
Marijuana Decriminalization -0.058 -0.117 -0.103
(-2.88) (-4.05) (-3.54)
Marijuana Price --_- ----- 0.0002
(2.97)
Chi-Squared 938.35 404.99 413.81
48Table 5 (continued)
Beer and Marijuana Prices, Drinking Ages, and MarijuanaDecriminalization
1989 Sample1989 Sample1989 Sample
Wholesale Retail Retail
Sinsemijia Commercial Sinsemilla
Variable Marijuana Marijuana Marijuana
Price Price Price
Panel A
Beer Price -6.970 -11.611 -8.660
(-1.76) (-3.28) (-2.42)
Minimum Legal Drinking Age -0.068 0.053 -0.116
(-0.80) (0.59) (-1.34)
Lower Border Age —
Marijuana Decriminalization -0.126 -0.035 -0.188
(-4.24) (-0.97) (-5.84)
Marijuana Price o.oooi 0.003 o.ooi
(1.86) (5.30) (3.57)
Chi-Squared 402.69 359.31 333.07
Panel B
Beer Price -6.400 -1 0.981 -7.966
(-1.61) (-3.09) (-2.22)
Minimum Legal Drinking Age -0.065 0.057 -0.112
(-0.76) (0.64) (-1.30)
Lower Border Age —---- —---
Marijuana Decriminalization -0.i30 -0.038 -0.192
(-4.37) (-1.06) (-5.96)
Marijuana Price o.oooi 0.003 0.001
(1.78) (5.33) (3.55)
Chi-Squared 408.17 363.38 337.87
49Table 5 (concluded)
Beer and Marijuana Prices, Drinking Ages, and Marijuana Decriminalization
Restricted 1989 Sample
Wholesale Wholesale Retail Retail
Commercial SinsemillaCommercialSinsemilla
Marijuana Marijuana Marijuana Marijuana
Variable Price Price Price Price
Panel A
Beer Price -9.568 -7.978 -9.661 -8.464
(-2.28) (-1.61) (-Z30) (-2.07)
Minimum Legal -0.044 -0.054 0.091 -0.182
Drinking Age (-0.48) (-0.60) (0.90) (-1.91)
Marijuana -0.142 -0.152 -0.037 -0.338
Decriminalization (.3.19) (-3.40) (-0.68) (-5.65)
Marijuana Price 0.0001 0.00003 0.003 0.002
(0.71) (0.69) (3.55) (4.78)
Chi-Squared 209.81 209.78 221.89 232.04
Panel B
Beer Price -8.948 -7.517 -9.040 -7.907
(-2.12) (-1.52) (-2.15) (-1 .87)
Minimum Legal -0.045 -0.054 0.088 -0.180
Drinking Age (-0.49) (-0.59) (0.88) (-1.88)
Marijuana -0.153 -0.161 -0.048 -0.342
Decriminalization (-3.40) (-3.57) (-0.89) (-5.73)
Marijuana Price 0.00004 0.00003 0.003 0.002
(0.55) (0.65) (3.46) (4.68)
Chi-Squared 215.25 215.31 226.92 236.75
50Table 6
Weighted Least Squares Estimates of Youth Motor Vehicle Accident Fatality Rates
Beer Taxes, Drinking Ages, and Marijuana Decriminalization
AJcohol
Total Fatality Night Driver Involved Driver
Variable Rate Fatality Rate Fatality Rate
Panel A:
Ages 15-24
Beer Tax -1 0.513 -1 0.401 -1 2.793
(-6.25) (-4.92) (-4.98)
Minimum Legal Drinking Age -0.012 -0.031 -0.015
(-1.82) (-3.94) (-1.52)
Marijuana Decriminalization -0.055 -0.125 -0.050
(-3.27) (-5.99) (-1.97)
R-Squared 0.538 0.428 0.649
F 29.04 18.98 42.81
n 650 650 565
Panel B:
Ages 18-20
Beer Tax -13.305 -1 5.360 -1 5.992
(-7.15) (-5.69) (-5.76)
Minimum Legal Drinking Age -0.030 -0.070 -0.041
(-4.12) (-6.94) (-3.86)
Marijuana Decriminalization -0.062 -0.143 -0.064
(-3.31) (-5.36) (-2.35)
R-Squared 0.651 0.561 0.705
F 45.77 31.48 54.44
'1 650 648 560
51Table 7
Policy Simulations: Probability of a Non-Fatal Motor Vehicle Accident
1989 Sample,
1989 Sample,Wholesale
Pooled No Price forCommercial
Policy Simulation Sample Marijuana Price
Inflation Tax Policy -5.84% -5.57% -4.67%
Nationwide Criniinalization +2.30% +4.43% + 3.92%
Nationwide Decriminalization -5.23% -10.11% -8.98%
Marijuana Price Reduction — — -3.52%




Inflation Tax Policy -3.71% -6.27% -4.50%
Nationwide Criminalization +4.94% +1.14% +7.71%
Nationwide Decriminalization -11.24% -3.62% -15.62%
Marijuana Price Reduction -2.25% -7.25% -4.90%
52Table 8
Policy Simulations: Probability of a Fatal Motor Vehicle Accident
.AJcohol
Total Fatality Night Driver Involved




Inflation Tax Policy -16.18% -16.02% -19.14%
-2,288 -375 -835
Nationwide Criminalization + 1.58% + 3.52% + 1.40%
+224 +62 +61




Inflation Tax Policy -19.94% -22.59% -23.19%
-1,037 -194 -350
Nationwide Criminalization + 1.77% +3.99% + 1.78%
+92 -1-34. +27
Nationwide Decriminalization -4.35% -9.89% 4.510/
-226 -194 -68
53